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The central question we asked at the outset of this volume was: what happened to family 
forms in the rural societies around the coasts of the North Sea in the last one and a half 
millennium? How did resources become available to the rural family and to its members, and 
what strategies were employed to generate these resources? The approach of this book is 
based on an analysis of long-term changes in household formation and in the economic 
behaviour of its members within a social and regional context.  
The North Sea area has a striking regional diversity, both in agricultural, social and 
institutional regimes. These regions have also a lot in common, above all, a broadly similar 
physical geography and a common history. They enjoy a moderate maritime climate and 
consist mostly of lowlands and some low mountain ranges. North-western Europe’s climate is 
characterised by moist winters and dry and warm summers that support an agriculture based 
on growing dry cereals (wheat, barley, oats or rye) as well as fruit and vegetable crops. To 
produce food, the land must be heavily worked to be cleared and fertilised, using large 
numbers of farm animals, both for their work and their manure.  
In this setting, the North Sea area developed during the second millennium as one of the most 
urbanised and commercialised in the world. The area encompassed a wide range of societies 
and agro-systems, some more market-oriented than others. A triangular zone including the 
western Low Countries, north-east France and south-east England was the core region, 
extending its influence throughout the North Sea area and well beyond. After the demise of 
the manorial systems, most of the inhabitants of the western European countryside owned or 
rented at least a small farm holding. In many regions, these small exploitations were often 
combined with temporary migratory or proto-industrial work. Rural communities were 
already organised at an early stage in the development of the western European countryside. 
They were responsible for intra-community litigation, poor relief, management of common 
land, collecting taxes, ensuring the public order, and so on. Except in the most peripheral 
regions, village societies were strongly oligarchic organised, with the power resting in the 
hands of a minority of property owners or their representatives who controlled the access to 
village resources (such as commons, employment and charity). This exercise of power in the 
village was strongly tied to the ownership of property and landholding. Wealthy householders 
had considerable power and control over the poor and landless. Possession and use of land 
were the cornerstone within the wide variety of rural survival strategies, although in the 
highly commercialised regions of the North Sea area the ties between the land and the rural 
household weakened during the period under consideration. Credit and exchange networks 
forged and strengthened social relations within the village communities. After 1500, in more 
commercialised regions and more generally after 1800, these village networks came under 
pressure, when a growing number of households sought their income beyond the traditional 
agricultural sector. Rural society in this area gradually transformed.  
The chapters in this book relate how households adapted, some more successfully than others, 
to these changes. In this concluding chapter we look at common and diverging features and 
trends of the western European rural family and income systems, set within the context of 
their social structural and regional transformations. Using a comparative lens we focus on 
some striking trends and differences. It is our ambition, shared with the teams of the other 
three volumes in this series, to develop a more general interpretative framework for our 
understanding of long-term changes in those rural societies around the coasts of the North 
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Sea. In attempting this conclusion, we follow the thematic outline used in the other chapters 
of this volume. 
 
 
13.1 The family and demography 
 
Around 500, almost the entire population around the North Sea lived in the countryside. 
Today, the experience of the majority is urban: about 80 per cent of the population now live in 
settlements with more than 2000 inhabitants. Since the middle of the nineteenth century, a 
process of deruralisation has been evident in every region within the North Sea area. In some 
agricultural regions such as Brittany, Picardy and Normandy the proportion of urban 
population came to exceed that of rural population only by the middle years of the twentieth 
century, while in others, such as in industrialised Belgium, this was already the case at the 
start of the twentieth century. Deruralisation implies more than the depopulation of rural 
communities, and also refers to the strong decline of the proportion of agricultural workers in 
the active population and the detachment from the rural way of life. Today, less than 5 per 
cent of the active population in the North Sea area works in agriculture compared to more 
than 50 per cent around 1900.  
The regions under study have displayed broadly similar patterns of population movement 
across the middle ages, the early modern and modern period. The timing and the nature of 
these movements, however, were marked by significant regional differences. In first instance, 
most regions within this part of north-western Europe underwent significant growth from the 
eleventh century through to at least the end of the thirteenth century. There are also earlier 
indications of population recovery and growth from the seventh and eighth centuries onwards. 
This period followed a long phase of demographic decline set in motion at the end of the third 
century, with record lows during the sixth century until the middle of the seventh century. The 
European economies of the early middle ages were able to experience moments of local 
intensification of the agrarian economy, leading to population growth and a strengthening of 
the links between town and countryside. In Flanders and the Paris region for example 
population density reached between 20 to 50 inhabitants per square kilometre. This early 
regional growth was small in comparison with the extended growth of the rural population 
which started in the eleventh century. The start of the late medieval crisis, at which point 
population growth was replaced with stagnation and decline, appears to have varied 
somewhat, though how far this is a consequence of historical or representational differences is 
unclear. There is though plentiful evidence that, at least in some countries (Denmark, 
England, France) population growth had halted by the first half of the fourteenth century, and 
decades before the crisis of the Black Death, whether that was the case in other parts of north-
western Europe remains unclear. In Norway and Sweden, for instance, it is suggested that 
population decline did not commence before the plagues of the mid-fourteenth century. 
Unsurprisingly, rural dwellers in most countries, in so far as this can be observed, experienced 
severe mortality in the middle years of the fourteenth century. However, it seems that in the 
Low Countries the long term fall in population was less pronounced and the consequences of 
the general crisis were limited. While it is difficult to reconcile the apparently limited effects 
of such a virulent epidemic which ravaged populations elsewhere, with any endogenous 
developments such as the policies of lords or central government or the higher standard of 
living, the reasons for such an aberrant result remain elusive. Although the demographic 
consequences of plague and endemic mortality were muted in parts of the Low Countries, 
there is no doubt that they continued apace throughout the rest of the North Sea area. A 
general stagnation of population, at least surmised for certain countries including England, 
has given way to population recovery and growth by the decades either side of 1500. In most 
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countries thereafter population growth continued, though not always in a consistent and 
upward trend, into the eighteenth century. Denmark for example, only regained its pre-plague 
population in the early nineteenth century.  
In the North Sea area, the demographic variables which can be associated with these 
movements vary by place and period. Attempts to identify the relative impact of fertility and 
mortality offer no simple solutions. A relatively recent debate concerning the potential 
significance of fertility in later medieval England is also mirrored in other national contexts 
here. The general assumption is that both must have had an impact upon population 
movement. The relative force of either variable or the extent to which demographic regimes 
were high or low pressure remains hidden, at least for the middle ages. Mortality is identified 
as the significant determinant in population movements in the middle ages in most of the 
studies presented here, our sources tending to direct more to evidence of mortality than of 
fertility. Both crisis mortality, occasioned both by epidemics and warfare, and background 
mortality including undoubtedly a lack of appropriate nutrition, high levels of infant mortality 
and endemic diseases throughout the population, must have had a severe impact upon the 
population of medieval and early modern northern Europe, even if historical sources which 
permit close investigation of such issues are elusive. Such crises were more acute in some 
regions than in others, and the causes could differ. Some regions in northern France, for 
instance, were less affected because they were mostly spared from military action, and they 
were far less dependent on grain production. Similarly, in early-modern times, grain-surplus 
areas such as Denmark and Skåne in southern Sweden suffered less from hunger-related 
diseases than other parts of Scandinavia. By the same token, there is some evidence of a 
fertility-driven demographic regime, or at least a regime influenced by changing fertility rates 
in the middle ages. Age at marriage, where it can be estimated, illustrates the lack of general 
consistency in terms of either place or period, but there is some sense that the mean age of 
marriage tended to increase in the middle ages, and the general trend was toward a north-west 
European household formation system of the kind described by Hajnal, with relatively late 
marriage for both partners (above age 24 for women and age 26 for men), life-cycle service 
and the presence of solitary households. In earlier centuries, surviving evidence suggests a 
household formation system more akin to that associated with southern Europe, with 
relatively early marriage for women (between age 15 and 20), if not for men (around age 30). 
We know, unfortunately, very little about other potentially significant elements capable of 
adjusting fertility rates, including the extent of the use of contraception and breastfeeding. 
By the early modern period, fuller and more direct demographic data permit a more robust 
investigation of the causes for the population movements described. In some countries, such 
as France, a demographic, relatively high pressure regime of heightened mortality and fertility 
persisted into the early modern period. As is well known, fertility, rather than mortality, has 
been identified as a prime mover of the demographic pattern evident for early modern 
England. In rural England (female) ages at marriage increased resulting in a fall in fertility in 
times when real wages were low and job opportunities were limited. In early modern rural 
Norway and Sweden ages at marriage were relatively low when there were prospects to create 
new viable positions for households due to land reclamation and by-employments. Delayed 
marriage, which was also related to changing female employment patterns, has helped to 
explain changes in fertility patterns and in consequent population movements, such as in parts 
of the Low Countries by the seventeenth century.  
Changing employment and marketing structures were undoubtedly capable of affecting some 
of the demographic changes outlined above. An important variable was the extent to which a 
region developed or failed to develop a significant urban sector. In this respect the experience 
of the Low Countries stands out as exceptional. While almost the whole population of the 
Low Countries lived in the countryside at the end of the first millennium, a massive 
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development in towns in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries led to a significant increase in the 
urban population. In central parts of the Low Countries such as Holland and Brabant, about 45 
per cent of the population lived in towns by the early modern period, a proportion not 
matched in any other northern European country at that time. Population density in some of 
those areas reached between 75 and 100 inhabitants per square kilometre. Elsewhere, huge 
urban centres such as Paris (600.000 inhabitants around 1700) and London (1 million 
inhabitants around 1800) developed a broad hinterland with a highly intensified and 
commercialised agriculture. In other countries within the broad North Sea area, most 
especially Norway and Sweden, population density remained low (up to 15 inhabitants per 
square kilometre) and the degree of urbanisation remained limited. However, as is pointed out 
in the discussion on Scandinavian demography and family, the limited extent of urbanisation 
does not argue against the presence of economic activity alternative to agriculture. The 
chapters in this volume point to the necessity to discuss demographic patterns within their 
agricultural and ecological context. Regional differences were considerable and manifested 
themselves in different agro-systems. Rural households in the southern Low Countries, for 
instance, used to be larger in the coastal marshlands where the soil was generally more fertile 
and the agricultural productivity higher, than in the inland areas.  The market-oriented 
economy of the coastal areas resulted in a larger demand for agricultural labour, a 
predominantly young and male population and large households due to the presence of living-
in servants. In the Paris Basin, the market oriented farms worked more with short-term and 
seasonal wage labour. Differences in agro-systems were thus reflected in the degree of 
migration, size and composition of rural households, but also in mortality and fertility levels. 
As such, mortality was chronically higher in the coastal marshlands. In the Low Countries, the 
lowlands of south-east England and the marshes of the river Weser in north-west Germany, it 
was linked to the incidence of malaria and the poor quality of the drinking water. In most 
regions, this high mortality was compensated by early marriage and high fertility levels. In 
others, such as the Oldenburg area in Germany, quite the opposite was true: the high degree of 
landless households led to very low birth rates. 
Although subject to debate, household formation in the medieval and early modern 
countryside tends to be seen as a function of a ‘peasant’ or ‘niche’ model: households 
operated in a neolocal system whereby marriage was the moment at which households were 
formed and the opportunity to marry was a function of land availability. Instances of this 
system have been discussed in all national contexts, as for instance in Germany before 1750. 
Alongside such a household formation system, there also existed a ‘proletarian’ or ‘real wage’ 
household formation system, driven not by land acquisition but by the accumulation of capital 
through labour. In this system, marriage remained a significant moment in household 
formation but the opportunity to marry was generated differently and was not dependent upon 
the acquisition of land. Such developments in household formation were not confined to 
towns. As we see in a variety of contexts, the spread of various types of proto-industry into 
the countryside created considerable opportunities for the kinds of capital accumulation 
identified with a ‘real wage’ household formation system. In some areas in England and 
north-west Germany proto-industrial workers married earlier and had more children, but in 
others they married later and had fewer children. In Denmark and inland Flanders, the 
traditional family pattern with high marriage age survived well into the nineteenth century. 
The implications of these differing household formation systems are important; systems of the 
kinds described here reflected the economic and social context in which households were 
themselves formed. The prevailing system also tended to reinforce the same context, 
perpetuating the demographic regimes which were, themselves, responsible in part for 
defining the rural economies in which they operated.  
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Figure 13.1: Trajectories of life expectancies and fertility, c.1750-c.1870 
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Sources: for Sweden, see Statistiska centralbyrån (1999): Befolkningsutvecklingen under 250 
år: Historisk statistik för Sverige, Stockholm; for England and France, see E.A. Wrigley, R.S. 
Schofield (1981), The population history of England 1541–1871: a reconstruction, 
Cambridge, 246; for Belgium, Coale's indicators from R. Lesthaeghe (1974), ‘Een 
demografisch model voor de Oostvlaamse landelijke populatie in de 18de eeuw’, Belgisch 
Tijdschrift voor Nieuwste Geschiedenis, 1-2, 93 and Princeton Population Center, data 
archive. These figures were transformed into TFR using a factor of 12.44 as suggested by J.-
P. Sardon (1996), ‘Coale's indices, comparative indices, mean generation, total fertility rate 
and components’, Population, 8, 252-257, and further into GRR using a factor of 0.5. Life 
expectancies from I. Devos (2006), Allemaal beestjes. Mortaliteit en morbiditeit in 
Vlaanderen, 18de-20ste eeuw, Gent, 40 (local data for 1750-1800) and from the mortality.org 
database. For Westphalia, we used a subset of the dataset analyzed for Germany in U. Pfister, 
G. Fertig (2010), The population history of Germany: research strategy and preliminary 
results (Max Planck Institute for Demographic Research Working Paper 35). 
 
Around 1750, the countries in north-western Europe entered a phase of economic and social 
change of unprecedented importance. For some of these regions, figure 13.1 assembles two 
important aspects of what is known about the demographic change after 1750: the long term 
development of fertility and mortality, expressed in terms of life expectancy at birth (e0 on the 
horizontal axis) and the gross reproduction rate (on the vertical axis: daughters per woman, a 
measure that varies not only with the frequency of births within marriage, but also with the 
frequencies of ages at marriage). Each data point describes the combination of fertility and 
mortality values in a specific period (mostly 5 years) for a specific region or country. The 
intrinsic growth rate of the population (r) results from the combination of these two variables; 
it reached values of about 1.7 per cent annually at the maximum (in the English case, in the 
years after 1815). For England, France (including the south) and Sweden, these data have long 
been known; they formed a central result of Wrigley and Schofield’s seminal Population 
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History of England. For parts of the Low Countries and of north-west Germany, they have 
been collected for the present discussion in order to get an impression of the entire North Sea 
area’s demographic history between 1750 and 1850. Three features stand out. First, the 
countries we study were very different particularly in terms of mortality. Deadly pre-1800 
Westphalia and France contrast with more healthy England, Belgium and Scandinavia. 
Second, fertility was not fixed at some ‘natural’ level, but highly variable. The English case 
has proven the old model of a demographic transition wrong, which assumed that fertility fell 
from a high ‘natural’ level only after a preceding mortality decline. We see that fertility was 
not ‘natural’ and invariable in pre-modern north-west European settings, and that the Swedish 
experience of a mortality decline on a fixed fertility level was not universal. The French 
example shows that both fertility and mortality could decline in a parallel fashion, and the 
English as well as the Westphalian examples demonstrate the importance in fertility upswings 
which did not lead to counterbalancing mortality crises. Third, as predicted by the old 
demographic transition model, there was a common trend in mortality, as opposed to fertility. 
Life expectancies rose everywhere, the least in England. An early mortality decline seems to 
have been the common demographic experience of the entire North Sea area. 
In the same period, more people started to live in towns and cities, a trend that continued 
throughout the twentieth century. Thanks to the establishment of national statistical institutes 
in the nineteenth century and the data they produced, these changes can be quantified with 
greater confidence than for pre-industrial times. Population figures in the countries around the 
North Sea more than doubled during the nineteenth century. The reactions to this rapid 
population increase, such as reduced nuptiality, increased migration or lower fertility, varied 
between countries. England where the population had grown faster, managed to escape a 
Malthusian crisis in which population outstripped the available resources, through a long term 
transformation of its economy. Industrialisation absorbed surplus population and facilitated 
early marriage and mass migration. Growth was essentially confined to the towns, and by 
1850 England had replaced the Netherlands as the most urbanised country in western Europe. 
Most rural regions in continental Europe however only lost the pattern of relative high 
marriage ages and relative high celibacy rates well into the twentieth century. Rural migration 
reduced the demographic pressure in the countryside especially after the mid-nineteenth 
century. After the agricultural crisis of the 1840’s and during the agricultural depression of the 
last quarter of the nineteenth century, some regions experienced an emigration wave to the 
America’s. In comparison to countries such as England, Germany, Sweden and Norway, 
overseas migration in the rest of the North Sea area remained limited. More important was the 
rural outmigration towards expanding industrial regions such as the German Ruhrgebiet, the 
Belgian Walloon area and northern France.  
In rural France, the main response involved a drastic modification of reproductive behaviour. 
North-western France, the region discussed in this volume, experienced an early demographic 
transition. It absorbed demographic pressure by excessively fragmenting land holdings and by 
adjusting the demographic system through systematic fertility control. By the second half of 
the eighteenth century birth rates started to fall. Although there are indications of family 
planning elsewhere (such as in parts in Scandinavia) from the late eighteenth century 
onwards, extensive birth control became only common in the rest of the North Sea area by the 
end of the nineteenth century. Fertility continued to decline throughout the twentieth century, 
and after 1970 dropped below replacement level. As a result, a new demographic equilibrium 
of both low mortality and fertility has been reached. Today, population growth in the 
countries around the North Sea, as in other industrialised areas, is on the verge of a standstill. 
Rural depopulation, as in France, has been replaced by a new ‘rurbanisation’, transforming 
large parts of the rural world in suburbanised areas. The new demographic regime resulted in 
a new family life-cycle pattern whereby fewer children are born (today, on average less than 2 
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children per women compared to 4 to 6 around 1750) and more children live beyond 
childhood. While high mortality was one of the main deterrents to guarantee land tenure 
within the family in the middle ages and the early modern period, the drastic decline in 
mortality rates together with falling birth rates during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, 
went along with new difficulties in perpetuating family lineages on the farms. As a result and 
together with the rise in life expectancy, the average age of the farmer population increased 
significantly. Finding a spouse for young farmers became difficult and the age at marriage 
among farmers continued to be higher than in other rural strata throughout the twentieth 
century. The farmer household became restricted to the couple and its children, and their 
demographic behaviour coincided with that of urban families. 
 
 
13.2 The family and its members 
 
Family farms based on a married couple, its children and additional live-in workers, have 
been the main organisational form of agricultural production in the countryside in north-
western Europe since the early middle ages. Other rural households, more numerous since the 
early modern period, provided labour or produced non-agricultural goods. These landless and 
(mostly) nearly landless households were also couple-centred and could include non-family 
workers as well. Today, the family farm is still dominant among the falling number of 
agricultural enterprises in the North Sea area. Non-family labour has been strongly reduced as 
a consequence of the mechanisation of labour on the farms.  
To interpret the internal relations within the rural households, the institutional, legal and 
religious frameworks have to be taken into account. The three main types of social relations 
(parents/children, husbands/wives, masters/servants) were of course of fundamental 
significance as categories of association since antiquity. Notions on these three relations of 
generation, gender and politico-economic domination have been transferred through canon 
law and political philosophy. Nevertheless, institutions associated with the family farm, such 
as property rights to buildings, land, cattle and tools, could vary to a considerable degree, and 
there was also a very broad scope in the ways that internal relations might be organised. In the 
early middle ages, larger feudal units of production were common, and family farms gained 
weight and autonomy only in the high middle ages. In the medieval period, the rights enjoyed 
by young men and women in entering into marriage were extended by the church relative to 
those of their parents and elders as well as the larger kin group. The north-west European 
nuclear household pattern is founded upon the fundamental theological innovation that 
marriage is a sacrament given by the couple to each other (consensus facit nuptias), and not 
by any societal institution. Although family farming had a very long genesis, the classical 
north-west European household formation pattern of a nuclear family, based upon a married 
couple and supported by immediate family members and servant and day labour and 
underpinned by relative late marriage, was only fully in place at the beginning of the early 
modern period. Despite the rise and decline of proto-industry and the nineteenth century legal 
changes, core elements of this pattern remained intact. Only in the twentieth century, 
mechanisation, scientification, and urbanisation changed the needs for and options of family 
labour. This fundamentally altered the roles and goals of farmers, servants, and children.  
During the period of sharp population decrease in the fifth and sixth centuries, the villa 
system with large estates and many dependents in the regions formerly occupied by the 
Romans made way for peasant societies. Peasant families lived in settlements with a limited 
number of farmsteads, similar to the situation in north-western Europe outside the Roman 
empire. As a result the core of most of the rural households in the early middle ages consisted 
of a nuclear family, although some farm buildings also gave shelter to a few dependents 
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(slaves, relatives). Couples and their children became the principal units of production, 
reproduction and consumption. This household structure fitted into the Christian model of 
conjugality as it spread across north-western Europe in the following centuries, a model that 
might have provoked a more narrow concept of kinship with less responsibilities for more 
distant relatives. This can be seen in Scandinavia in the eleventh and twelfth centuries, the last 
part of north-western Europe to Christianise. Small scale peasant farming was the prime 
means of existence of households, whether their members were freemen or serfs. Despite the 
importance of family farming, even the early medieval rural society was not egalitarian, as an 
elite of warriors dominated most of the rural peasantry turning them into tenants or serfs. In 
most places slavery changed into serfdom at the end of the millennium, except in Scandinavia 
and the British Isles. In the more affluent households, slaves were replaced by a large number 
of male and female servants (mostly life cycle servants). By the fifteenth century, serfdom 
had nearly completely dwindled away. It experienced a revival in central Europe in the early 
modern period, and some seigniorial rights remained in existence until the nineteenth century. 
The prime household organisation unit was the ‘manse’, consisting of a farm, land, cattle and 
equipment enough to feed a ‘family’ in the broadest sense of the word. Although the manse 
could be a large household, data for north-western France in the ninth century show that about 
three quarters of the households consisted of a single nuclear family or a solitary person. The 
remaining quarter consisted partly of extended households. The same data suggest an average 
household size of 4.5 to 5.5, which is about the same level to be found in the next ten 
centuries. In England, for instance, average household sizes fluctuated between 3.7 and 5.2 in 
the middle ages and the early modern period. Extended and multiple households remained the 
exception all over north-western Europe in the second millennium.  
Household structures changed considerably during the life cycle. After marriage most 
households only consisted of the man and his wife, often supplemented by non-nuclear family 
members or servants. After the birth of the children, the household size started to increase. 
When children were able to work, non-nuclear members left the household. By the time 
grown-up children married and left the parental house, they again could be replaced by 
servants. Consequently household composition was heavily influenced by factors such as the 
number of surviving children or family members. The weight of the nuclear family differed 
strongly between regions. In some of them, the extension of the nuclear family with a survivor 
of the older generation or some unmarried brothers and sisters was a normal stage in the 
family life cycle, while elsewhere couples nearly always lived in a nuclear households 
(neolocality). However, all over north-western Europe a preference for male succession 
combined with high male ages at marriage limited the frequency of three-generation 
households already before 1500.  
 
From the ninth century onwards perceived differences between free and unfree tenants had 
diminished and peasants are sometimes, and not always correctly, identified as a seemingly 
uniform social group. However, within the European peasantries there were in fact large 
social differences, mostly determined by the size and the property structure of land holdings. 
Rich rural households controlling large land holdings were considerably more populous than 
poor households with a limited access to land. This pattern survived in north-western Europe 
until well into the twentieth century. The differences in household size are related to the 
presence in the larger farmsteads of slaves and later on servants (comprising 10 to 15 per cent 
of the population), and to the absence of teenage and adult children on the smaller holdings. 
The incidence of non-nuclear household structures was strongly connected to the demand for 
labour and to the succession strategies of larger farmers. Despite the disappearance of 
serfdom and notwithstanding sharp regional variations, social differences within the peasantry 
in the countryside increased nearly everywhere in the course of the second millennium. 
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Population pressure, agricultural specialisation, proto-industrialisation, concentration of land 
titles and proletarianisation all contributed to this process. This social differentiation was not a 
linear process. During the population crisis of the second half of the fourteenth and the 
fifteenth centuries the group of smallholders and landless labourers mostly shrank, to increase 
again from the sixteenth century onwards. In parts of England and France (for instance the 
Paris Basin and Picardy) and along the North Sea coasts of the Low Countries and Germany, 
processes of social polarisation probably started earlier and were stronger than elsewhere. 
Here the majority of the rural households in the early modern period had only tiny units of 
land at their disposal or were landless, making them heavily dependent on (proto-industrial) 
contract labour or wage labour. The growing social differences and especially the increased 
number of landless rural poor fuelled the life cycle servant system, which became a crucial 
part of the European rural societies until the nineteenth and sometimes twentieth centuries. 
The disappearance of this system caused a major convergence in household size between 
social groups. By the year 2000, the phase in the family life cycle (for instance, whether the 
head of household is newly-wed or old-aged) has become a far more important determinant of 
the size of the rural household. 
Major variable in household formation are the practices of succession and inheritance. 
Succession is not the same thing as inheritance. One can succeed into a social position: an 
office, a feudal relation, the role of leading a business (including the business of farming). 
One can inherit property: money, tools, land. Before the nineteenth century, peasants in most 
regions had no full property rights on land, so an absolute inheritance of land was out of the 
question. The standard case involved four types of actors who had to deal with each other’s 
interests in the farm: the lord, the current tenant/landholder, their successor, and the 
successor’s siblings. In the nineteenth century, lordship as a category largely disappeared in 
the rural societies studied here, although their role was in some regions replaced by land-
owners. Where land was owned by the farmers, only three potential parties to transfer were 
left, the farm still being the central platform of their negotiations (see figure 13.2).  
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In the last two centuries, debates on inheritance and succession practises often revolved 
around the fear of politicians that subdivision would threaten the integrity of the holding, 
including its viability in terms of size and structure. Partibility, however, was not the only 
important aspect of the transfer of resources between generations. In some regions, the overall 
shares each child would receive were calculated and kept track of exactly, while in other 
regions parents were free to give as much as they pleased. Another factor is whether 
daughters were entitled to the same shares of inherited property as sons, as well as the 
question if they could own land. Gender relations were also dependent on marital property 
systems (joint property versus separate property), with deep consequences for the roles of 
widow, widowers, and their new spouses. Finally, the ways resource transfers were organised 
could be institutionalised through law, through case-by-case contracts between the old and 
new generations and the lords, or through testaments.  
Early evidence for Saint-Remi near Rheims in the ninth century suggests a strong preference 
on the part at least of lords for the succession of the eldest son on the tenant farmsteads 
(primogeniture) to secure continuity and the reproduction of a qualified labour force. The 
rights of women (widows, daughters, sisters) on these hereditary manses were very weak. 
Presumably this model of primogeniture on larger farms remained dominant in the following 
centuries. The property rights of females on freehold land were slightly better. Since on 
average about 4 out of every 10 couples did not have surviving sons, this gave room for the 
transfer of farmsteads to married daughters and others. Free farmsteads often fragmented after 
inheritance. The selling of these inherited parts promoted the move from hereditary land 
tenure to a land market from the tenth century onwards. On the one hand this land market 
Figure 13.2: Parties and their claims in property transfers 
current/outgoing 
tenant/landholder 
heir siblings 
farm inheritance inheritance 
compensation 
provision in case 
of illness 
property 
Retirement 
arrangement 
Terms in standard type designate parties involved in property transfer,  arrows and 
terms in italics refer to claims arising from the expectations of one party and 
directed towards another. Adapted from C. Fertig (2003),‘Hofübergabe im 
Westfalen des 19. Jahrhunderts: Wendepunkt des bäuerlichen Familienzyklus?’, in 
C. Duhamelle and J. Schlumbohm (eds.), Eheschließungen im Europa des 18. und 
19. Jahrhunderts: Muster und Strategien, Göttingen, 77 (Veröffentlichungen des 
Max-Planck-Instituts für Geschichte 197). 
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opened up possibilities for land accumulation of individual households, on the other hand 
more and more free land fell into the hands of the lords. 
In northern France and the Low Countries inheritance was usually divided quite equally 
between surviving sons and daughters; however exceptions to this general rule, such as those 
pertaining in Normandy, the Paris Basin and the Frisian parts of the Low Countries, remained 
important. In England, unequal systems of succession prevailed from the late middle ages 
onwards. Under the system of primogeniture younger sons received some small pieces of land 
or were helped with an apprenticeship, while daughters were provided with dowries of 
moveable goods or money. The position of widows was relatively weak; they received usually 
only a third of their husband’s land during their lifetime. Also here, regional diversity 
remained important, such as the system of equal division between all sons in Wales. One 
individual inherited the land while his co-inheritors were compensated with rents.  
One of the factors defining inheritance practices was the difference between partible and 
impartible holdings. In Denmark and Norway, for example, freeholders were prohibited by 
law from dividing their holdings. In north-western Germany and large parts of the Low 
Countries and Scandinavia the farm holding was not divided between the children, but was 
taken over by just one heir, who compensated the others for their part of the inheritance. In 
some regions like north-western Germany this could result in a kind of primogeniture with the 
oldest son succeeding. Other systems were also possible like ultimogeniture with the youngest 
son or the youngest daughter taking over the family holding. This strong family-land bond, as 
for example in early modern Germany, promoted the continuation of the family farm and a 
preference for the succession of sons. Elsewhere, as in parts of the Low Countries and France, 
the continuation of family lineage seems to have been of less importance in the early modern 
period with numerous farms being passed to strangers. Family holdings were divided, with the 
exception of the large tenant farms, causing land ownership to become very scattered, with 
numerous freehold peasants owning several tiny plots of land. With each generation, these 
plots were redistributed among the heirs, exchanging, buying and selling these plots without  
much signs of attachment to the family land. After marriage a couple started a process of land 
accumulation, which was partly made possible by dowries and inheritances. After about the 
age of 55 the size of the land holdings of a household started to diminish again, freeing land 
for the next married generation. In this way the size of the land holdings of a household 
remained more or less in accordance with the available labour supply in the household, which 
of course changed considerably over the family lifecycle.  
The transfer of a farm to off-spring was one of the main ambitions of the family in most rural 
households until the nineteenth century. This transfer was not automatic, hampered as it was 
by a preference for neolocality. In Scandinavia, for instance, a married child was normally 
only allowed to take over the farm holding after the death of at least one of the spouses of the 
older generation. Often, intervivos transfer contracts were concluded in order to guarantee 
members of the former generation the livelihood on the farm or in a separate house. 
Comparable retirement contracts can be found elsewhere in north-western Europe. In early 
modern Sweden and parts of Germany, a strong emphasis was placed upon preserving the 
family lineage on the farm, thus restricting the rights of newcomers who opportunities tended 
to be confined to remarriage of  a widow or widower. In other North Sea regions the new (and 
often younger) spouse was able to keep control of the farm. Recurrent remarriages clearly 
complicated practices of succession and division. In rural England and in the coastal parts of 
the Low Countries, the concern for the continuity of the family farm seems to have been 
considerably less, partly due to the increasing number of landless or nearly landless rural 
households. Within these social groups household formation and the place of settlement were 
mainly related to the income opportunities of the new couple and less to the acquisition of 
parental resources upon marriage. In some parts of England, an extensive land market for 
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tenures existed already in the thirteenth century opening up ways for more well-to-do 
households to acquire land in other ways than by (post-mortem) inheritances. In early modern 
England, France and the Low Countries this land market increased considerably, often 
resulting in the transfer of land and farms to non-family. In early modern Scandinavia and 
north-western Germany on the other hand the alienation of holdings happened less frequently.  
In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, many of the fundamental features of family farming 
persisted, despite the fast- changing environment. Much more than other social groups, 
farmers continued the old marriage and inheritance strategies. Both the viability of the farm 
and a fair distribution of property and resources to offspring remained important goals for the 
rural family. Since the late nineteenth century, succession strategies changed due to more 
income alternatives outside agriculture. One of them was to strengthen the non-successors’ 
human capital through schooling instead of guaranteeing large marriage dowries. The 
mechanisation of farming implied the use of capital instead of labour, making it more difficult 
to give money to non-successors, while simultaneously reducing the need to keep them on the 
farm. The new problem farmers faced in the twentieth century was how to find a successor 
among their declining number of children. Not only had it become harder for a successor to 
compensate the siblings for their legal share in the increasingly more expensive family farm, 
the take-over had also become less attractive due to the rise of real earnings and 
improvements in the standard of living outside agriculture. For the same reasons young 
farmers frequently had difficulties finding a partner.  
Pre-modern rural households were run by a working couple, with unequal legal rights but in 
practice with equal responsibilities. In legal terms, in medieval, early modern and, to a lesser 
degree, modern times rural households were strictly patriarchal, with the male head having 
full authority to act on behalf of his family, while the rights of his wife, children and other 
members of the household were limited. There is evidence that at the end of the middle ages 
improving property rights of widows and a diminution of the age differences at marriage 
strengthened the negotiation position for married women. In fact, the power division within 
the household was more equal than legal arrangements suggest, a situation that changed again 
in the late nineteenth century, with the development of a more unbalanced relationship 
between breadwinner and housewife. 
There is ample evidence that in the high middle ages a clear gender division in agricultural 
labour existed, enforced by cultural norms. Men ploughed and worked in the fields and the 
forests, while women took care of the children, cleaned the house, kept the garden and cared 
for the animals near the house. Only in busy harvest times did both sexes work together in the 
fields. Part of these gender differences were related to gendered capacities, with men doing 
the physically heaviest tasks. This gendered division of labour restricted female family 
members mostly to the domain of the farmstead, while males dominated the public sphere. 
This division of farm work between the sexes remained by and large the same until the 
twentieth century. By then mechanisation changed the nature of the activities on the farms 
drastically, partly mixing up the gendered activities inasmuch as physical strength became 
less important to accomplish tasks. Because women had a very specific role in agriculture and 
in most proto-industrial activities, their presence was indispensable in most households. The 
gendered division of work made a certain balance between able-bodied males and females in 
the household necessary. Shortages in family labour supply were filled by hired labour. From 
the middle ages onwards an increasing number of households with small land holdings 
exchanged their labour surplus with larger farm holdings. Their grown-up children usually 
became life cycle servants. In this way, the local labour market and the life cycle servant 
system smoothened out discrepancies between supply of and demand for male and female 
labour inside the individual households.  
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In many rural regions, such as the southern Netherlands from the twelfth century, and the 
Scandinavian woodlands and the regions around Osnabruck (Germany) from the sixteenth 
century, the increasing number of smallholders was accompanied by the rising proto-
industrial demand for both male and female work. Proto-industrial work also had a strong 
gendered character, but not in ways that were immutable. Weaving, for example, was mostly 
a male task, except in Sweden and Norway where it was predominantly done by women. 
Everywhere, women were employed as spinners in wool and cloth production. Rural 
industries flourished mostly in regions dominated by small mixed farms. The combination of 
small-scale farming and rural industry offered most household members extra security against 
harvest failures and trade fluctuations. Rural specialisation in economic activities partly 
directed to local markets (handicrafts, transport, trade) also gained in weight in early modern 
Europe.  
This process of specialisation accelerated all over the north-western European countryside  
during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, alongside the retreat of agriculture as the prime 
economic sector. The rise of income possibilities in large scale industry, trade and services 
transformed the former family economy into a family wage economy, and at the end of the 
twentieth century into a more ‘individualistic’ wage economy. As said this affected, in 
relation to more social provisions and a steep rise in welfare, the female position in the 
household economy. With the rise of the male bread-winner model, the work of married 
females was increasingly restricted to taking care of the home and the children, with only 
limited possibilities for (mostly less-rewarded) economic activities. The traditional central 
female function in the rural household economy faded away, alongside the rapid decline of 
independent family businesses (whether a farm, a shop or a trade). Since the 1960’s, the 
female emancipation movement and a strong increase in female education levels, opened up 
better-paid jobs for women. At the start of the twenty-first
 
century, however, male and female 
positions on the labour market remain unbalanced, since married females interrupt their 
professional career and still perform most of the tasks inside the house.  
The position and the life cycle of children below the age of 12-14 in rural households 
radically changed during the second millennium. There seemed to be a slow increase in 
investment by the parents in their (broader) education, partly forced by external institutions. 
With the introduction of a village education system in the early modern period, children (more 
often boys than girls) aged 6 to 12 usually went to school during certain periods of the year 
(winter). It was common for young children to perform specific tasks on farms, especially 
during busy harvest times. In keeping with their physical strength, their role in household 
production increased between the age of 12 and 16. At those ages, juveniles from the lower 
social strata became live-in servants in more wealthier households. Everywhere in north-
western Europe the role of children in the household economy diminished drastically during 
the twentieth century. The prime causes were the creation of a compulsory schooling system 
until the age of about 16, and the strong rise in opportunities for full-time education beyond 
the age of 16. This development implied a major shift in the position of children as active 
contributors to the household income, to investors in their own future. 
 
 
13.3 The family and income  
 
The most striking continuity in the household economy of the agricultural population between 
500 and 2000 concerns the access to land. Although its legal status, its distribution and its 
value changed drastically over the course of fifteen centuries, land remained intimately 
connected to agricultural production. Fields however do not produce crops by themselves. 
Land, in combination with labour, enables the rural population to exploit natural resources. A 
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bird’s eye view of the changes taking place between 500 and 2000 indicates that rural 
societies around the North Sea have successfully managed, albeit in a slow and very uneven 
way, to release labour from agriculture. In terms of labour productivity, the track record of 
north-western Europe is impressive. The chapters in this book reveal that all rural regions 
experienced a gradual shift from an almost purely agrarian society to a more diversified rural 
economy in the long run.  
Between 500 and 2000 different cycles and chronologies can be observed in the relationship 
between agricultural production and labour organisation. Some forms of labour emerged 
during this period and then disappeared again. For example, agricultural day labourers were 
probably as scarce around 1000 as they are in present-day north-western Europe. 
Geographical differences within the North Sea area were also important. Whereas early 
modern England was marked by a clear tendency towards a growing number of landless 
labourers, the vast majority of the rural population in France did have access to property 
rights. Diverging forces and institutions profoundly influenced household labour and 
economies at the regional level too. In the Low Countries, for instance, differences can be 
observed between the coastal plains and the inland regions. In the former, farm engrossment 
from the sixteenth century onwards led to a greater number of wage dependent labourers 
compared to the hinterland where a small holding served as the most important source of 
income for the rural population. Nevertheless, it is possible to discern some significant trends 
that characterised the rural communities around the North Sea and how they used their local 
pool of labour.  
The overviews in this volume indicate that the self-contained and risk-averse peasant 
household was at no stage, either geographical or chronological, the dominant form of rural 
production. The idealtype ‘Chayanovian’ peasant family and holding is an interesting 
analytical category, but proved to be rather absent in north-western Europe. Historically, one 
of the most important challenges for rural producers was the control over their own labour 
power. The rural population of north-west Europe gradually attained the right to dispose of 
their own labour. Although serfdom remained a legal reality in some regions (for instance, in 
England) until the sixteenth century, the late medieval period generally marked the end of 
serfdom in Europe. In Scandinavia for example, the late medieval population crisis 
accelerated this process. By the end of the middle ages, most of the rural population around 
the North Sea had managed to free themselves from the manorial economy and especially 
from the labour services imposed upon them by the lords. Coerced labour gradually 
disappeared and, as a result, enabled households to develop a labour strategy largely 
independent from the manor and its lord. Although peasant families and the manorial 
economy remained intricately linked for many centuries hereafter, labour was now fully 
rewarded and choices could be made more freely in terms of household labour allocation and 
mobility.  
The late medieval and especially the early modern period were characterised by forms of 
labour organisation that were increasingly complex and varied. A market for labour gradually 
emerged and governed the decisions of the rural households from then onwards. The Black 
Death, and the labour shortages arising from the demographic decline, accelerated this 
emergence of a labour market. Almost everywhere in Europe the first attempts at introducing 
some form of labour legislation (mostly pertaining to the level of wages and mobility of the 
labour force) can be traced to the second half of the fourteenth century. This suggests that 
rural households made the most of the opportunities offered to them by scarcity of labour. The 
late medieval period was marked by a new configuration of labour that continued to spread in 
the following centuries. The Black Death had created the optimal demographic conditions that 
enabled rural households to earn a living outside the boundaries of their own holding. 
Although England and the northern Netherlands displayed distinct trends towards a growing 
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share of landless labourers by the early modern period, in most regions however, the bulk of 
the household incomes was still derived from their own holding. On these farms household 
members combined forces to produce a variety of foodstuffs that were used first and foremost 
for their own consumption.  
One of the most significant changes concerned the nature and the sources of household 
income. Holdings gradually developed into  production units that extended their reach beyond 
the typical agrarian activities. Production on agricultural holdings became increasingly 
diversified throughout the early modern period. The chapters in this volume illustrate that vast 
numbers of the rural population engaged in activities other than traditional agriculture. Proto-
industrial production or rural industries flourished in north-western Europe during the early 
modern period. Populations in these regions were in particular active in textile production 
such as wool and linen. In Denmark and eastern Belgium rural household also engaged in the 
production of potteries and iron. In some regions it was not until the second half of the 
nineteenth century that these industrial bye-employments ceased to exist; in Sweden many 
rural industries thrived until well into the first half of the twentieth century. The nature of 
these bye-employments were strongly determined by local conditions. In the Low Countries 
for example, urban textile industries triggered the expansion of proto-industrial textile 
production in the surrounding countryside. In coastal communities it was not uncommon to 
combine agriculture with commercial fishing activities. During the early modern period many 
of the rural households in these regions ceased to be purely agricultural producers. In the 
economically most advanced parts of the Low Countries an important section of the 
population already relied on non-agricultural production as a vital part of their household 
economy since the late middle ages. The rural industries continued to flourish until production 
in centralised units such as factories proved to be less costly. But in hindsight, 
industrialisation started in the countryside.  
To what extent these new forms of activities and sources of household income fundamentally 
changed the dynamics governing household decisions has been intensely debated by 
historians. Although in some regions rural industries had an impact on the size and 
composition of the household and interacted with the process of household formation, these 
influences were not a general rule. In some parts of England the spread of textile production 
in the countryside resulted in a lower age at first marriage. In Flanders, an opposite trend can 
be discerned: the age at first marriage rose and fewer adolescents set up a household in proto-
industrial areas. Although different forms of proto-industrial activity can be observed in 
north-western Europe, no universal proto-industrial economic model has been identified. 
Most historians however agree that the combination of agricultural and industrial production 
did have an impact on the use of household labour. Directly or indirectly, the activities of one 
or more members of a household in non-agricultural activities produced some economic 
effects. One of these effects was the more efficient use of the work capacities of the 
household group. As a result of these industrial activities, more members of the household 
engaged in work and the number of work hours performed by all members of the household 
probably increased. The rise in the number of activities concentrated on one holding was not 
necessarily restricted to small holdings. Large farms too were production sites that were 
characterised by a growth in the variety of activities performed. Although in some regions 
large farms tended to specialise in specific crops or cattle, in other regions the economic elite 
of the countryside also turned their activities to commercial textile production or brewing.  
Around 1800 the nature of economic activities in the countryside was quite different from 
around 1000. Rural households engaged in a number of activities that were no longer 
agricultural. The occupational structure of rural communities had also changed fundamentally 
as a result of this growing diversification of rural production. The number of rural artisans, 
catering to the needs of both large and small farms, gradually increased. Next to the 
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traditional blacksmith, also shopkeepers, shoemakers and carpenters made their appearance in 
rural communities. From an occupational viewpoint, there was a growing urbanisation of the 
countryside. This latter trend was only reversed in the second half of the twentieth century. 
Rural industries were important in the countryside and still continue to absorb some of the 
household labour in present-day Europe. The period stretching from the middle of the 
nineteenth to the third quarter of the twentieth century was characterised by a retreat from 
non-agricultural activities on farms. To a large extent the disappearance of rural industries 
also resulted in the gradual disappearance of the small farm. In Sweden and Norway, where 
industry took hold of the countryside, industrialisation seems to have been accompanied in the 
late nineteenth century by an increase in the number of small freehold farms, and a decrease 
in crofts and cottages.  
A second feature, next to the growth of various types of bye-employments, that characterised 
rural households during this long period is the growing importance of agricultural labour 
performed outside the context of the individual household unit. In other words, agricultural 
labour was increasingly sold to other economic agents in the countryside. Households sold 
their excess labour power to farms that lacked intra-household labour. In most cases, 
household members of small farms worked on larger holdings during the peak moments in 
agriculture. Again, differences in scope and intensity can be observed within north-west 
Europe. For instance, around the middle of the eighteenth century c.60 per cent of the 
population in the German district of Belm had no access to land and were forced to earn a 
living through wage labour. In England and the northern Low Countries a similar social 
structure can be discerned. In most of northern France and the southern Low Countries 
however, there were few agricultural day labourers that were employed all year round by 
large farms. There was nonetheless an undeniable trend towards a greater reliance on wage 
labour as a complementary source of income. Population growth, the subdivision of holdings, 
farm engrossment, and so on. all contributed to the emergence of a labour market for 
agricultural labour. In most cases this labour market was local;  small farms sold their labour 
to larger holdings in the same parish.  
During the sixteenth century more complex forms of labour organisation emerged. The 
development of migrant labour is in fact an important episode in the rural history of north-
west Europe. In the regions directly bordering the North Sea, migrant labourers can be 
encountered from the late sixteenth century. In most cases these migrants were active in 
harvest labour, but also non-agricultural enterprises depended on migrant labour (constructing 
dikes, for example). Members of the rural household had to migrate beyond the borders of 
their own parish in order to secure a livelihood and part of the household income was 
generated at some physical distance. After 1750 these migration patterns became more intense 
and a substantial part of the labour performed during peak seasons in agriculture was not hired 
locally anymore. After 1850 migration continued to be a factor of importance for rural 
households, but employment patterns also changed at this time. Industry started to replace 
agriculture as a source of income for rural households. This does not mean that farms in the 
twentieth century no longer depended on income derived from non-agricultural labour. A 
large share of households active in agriculture had members employed as wage earners in 
different sectors. For the vast majority of the rural populations in north-west European ,in past 
and present, agricultural production proved thus to be unsatisfactory in order to make ends 
meet. Rural industry (or non-agricultural bye-employment) and wage labour were in fact two 
of the main characteristics of employment in the North Sea area. Historians disagree on the 
origins of this pattern. Whilst some have argued that changes in household production and 
labour organisation were primarily driven by economic necessity, others have advanced the 
theory that market opportunities explain these developments.  
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The chapters in this volume also reveal some other characteristics. Everywhere in Europe, 
common land and common rights gradually vanished. In Flanders, for example, common land 
had already disappeared by the late middle ages. In early modern northern Germany common 
land was steadily integrated in agricultural holdings. Common land, and access to communal 
resources, survived in England and France well into the nineteenth century but were almost 
extinct by the onset of World War I. For the households with access to common land and 
rights, the income that could be derived from them was not unimportant. Some historians 
have argued that the loss of common rights, such as the right to pasture cattle, collect 
firewood, etc. resulted in a net financial loss for the household economy that needed to be 
compensated for by other forms of household income. On the short and medium term the 
decline of the commons and the restricted access to common rights produced serious 
challenges to the household economy. The gradual disappearance of common land and rights 
as a source of household income indicates that rural households came to depend less on more 
communally governed means of production.  
 
With regard to the household economy of the rural population, the overviews in this book also 
stress the importance of credit facilities and networks in the countryside. In fact, credit 
emerges as a factor of economic significance at a fairly early stage. Usury legislation and the 
frequent references to debt litigation in late medieval court rolls suggest that the rural families 
already greatly relied on credit. In the following centuries a vast number of sources testify to 
the importance of credit for rural households.  
Although credit did take diverse forms across time and space, some elements are 
characteristic of north-west Europe. First, the use of credit was closely linked to the 
availability of coin and the money supply. Many of the credit transactions used in rural 
communities were the result of coin shortages. In other words, the value of all goods and 
services produced and sold in the countryside vastly exceeded the money supply. Credit was a 
collective strategy to overcome the problem of scarcity of money. In these cases, loans and 
deferred payment were closely linked to the kin group and the local or village community. For 
large loans, peasantries frequently resorted to urban moneylenders. Second, the use of credit 
was clearly linked to events that were crucial in the life course of a household. Large loans 
contracted by the rural population were in many cases closely connected to the acquisition 
and the transfer of land. As a market in land accelerated, credit facilities and instruments were 
introduced that enabled rural households to finance these transactions. Third, credit was also 
extended by urban entrepreneurs and traders to peasants to optimise production. Especially in 
proto-industry, credit permitted rural households to acquire the necessary tools and materials 
to engage in production. This however does not mean that all credit was beneficial to the rural 
population in the long run. In France, for example, the expropriation of the peasantry in 
favour of urban citizens was preceded by an upsurge in debts contracted with the latter. There 
were certainly risks attached to the use of credit, but it is now also apparent that the 
widespread use of credit contributed to the market involvement of the rural population. 
In the course of the nineteenth century credit facilities institutionalised. Banks and other credit 
institutions took over the role of the amalgam of credit relations that existed during the 
previous centuries. From that time onwards, credit was increasingly separated from the village 
communities and a more impersonal market emerged. Financial institutions, and no longer 
individuals, supplied the credit that rural producers needed.  
 
 
13.4 The family, the local community and the state  
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The interactions of rural households with the larger social, religious and political forces 
within and beyond the community constitute the last topic in this volume. Again, the 
interactions were complex, and in some cases highly unique. This was the case in Denmark, 
for instance, where the old feudal order remained intact much longer than in the rest of the 
North Sea area. In most regions, discontinuity characterised the long term relationship of rural 
households with upper-level institutions such as the lord, the village council, the church and 
the state.   
During the early middle ages the manor was not only the centre of economic activity in the 
village, it also monopolised political and social life. It can be considered the most important 
external force in the daily life of rural populations around the North Sea. In the following 
centuries this pattern drastically changed because the lord lost his monopoly of power. The 
roles once assumed by the lord and the manor were taken over by a number of new 
institutions in most of north-western Europe between the ninth and thirteenth centuries. Many 
of these also continued in existence until quite recently. Thus, in northern France and north-
west Germany, village institutions developed during the eleventh and twelfth centuries. These 
institutions consisted mainly of associations of rural populations at the village or community 
level and ruled a variety of local activities. Some associations were established in order to 
impose a structure upon economic life, whereas others also served a more spiritual goal. 
Already, from the seventh and early eighth centuries, certain forms of these organisation can 
be observed. However, it was not until the twelfth century that village councils, priests and 
poor relief institutions were regularly installed across north-western Europe. This process was 
related to the development of numerous villages, often with a church, as a result of the 
accelerating growth of population since the tenth and eleventh centuries.  
As said, throughout the late medieval and early modern period the power of the lord declined, 
both in economic and political terms. Firstly, from the later middle ages, the lord no longer 
enjoyed a monopoly on surplus extraction. The emergence of the nation state and state 
taxation fundamentally changed this pattern. Surpluses produced in the countryside had to be 
shared with others. The conversion of many seigniorial rights from payments in kind into 
fixed payments in cash gradually eroded the income and economic power of the lords. 
Second, in terms of political power, the influence of the lord on village life also declined. For 
example, litigation in the countryside was no longer restricted to the manorial court. Cities, 
but also the central state, assumed some of the political and legal roles that had been 
traditionally reserved to lords. They did however retain a powerful position as landowners. 
Extensive property rights ensured that they continued to be important political and economic 
agents within rural communities. Lords also continued indirectly to exert their influence. In 
some associations such as the village council, the representatives of the lord (in many cases 
his tenant farmers) continued to safeguard his interests as landowner. As such, lords did not 
disappear completely from the countryside. Their power however clearly dwindled throughout 
the early modern period. The French revolution witnessed the abolition of feudalism and 
lordship in most north-western European regions. In regions unaffected by revolutionary 
legislation, lords continued to be a factor of importance. In Prussia, for example, lords and 
nobility enjoyed the right, until the middle of the nineteenth century, to reclaim land when 
peasants passed away without heirs. Lords, then, did not disappear from the countryside, but 
their influence was gradually restricted.  
Contrary to the experience of the manor and the lord, the village council was an institution 
that grew in importance during the late middle ages and the early modern period. The role of 
these different types of village councils was twofold. They played an important part in 
regulating and organizing intra-community economic life and also acted as an intermediary 
between the state and the rural household. As such they constituted an important factor for the 
rural population. The village councils were not democratically composed, and the decision-
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making process was strongly influenced by the representatives of the lord and the most 
important landowners. Both freeholders and tenants took part in the decisions, whilst the 
landless were usually excluded. It was not until the nineteenth century that measures were 
taken to democratise the composition of the village councils. As said, the councils regulated 
many aspects of economic life: they set the dates for the start of the harvest, decided upon 
communal crop rotation schemes and maintained local infrastructure such as roads and 
waterways. In some cases they also administered common land and rights. In Britain and in 
continental western Europe, village councils also interacted with the state, whilst in 
Scandinavia this interaction usually took place via district courts. The village council, or, in 
Scandinavia, the district court, were the institutions through which national legislation was 
enacted and applied at a local level. As such they constituted an important link in the process 
of state formation during the early modern period. In some regions village councils were 
responsible for distributing the burden of taxation and collecting state taxes. From the 
nineteenth century on, the power of these village councils gradually eroded. The political-
decision making process shifted to higher political echelons, first to the national state, and in 
the second half of the twentieth century to Europe. At present the European Union is the most 
relevant level in terms of rural and agricultural policies.  
In short, the role and impact of the village community, or somesuch entity, changed 
profoundly during the last millennium. During the late medieval and early modern period, its 
power and influence, both internal and external, expanded, but during the last two centuries 
village communities and their like have experienced a steady erosion of their political power. 
As a result, farmers and agricultural producers have largely retreated from political life at the 
local level. This withdrawal is not only caused by the decreasing number of farmers in the 
village, but also because their contribution to the local economy has become less important 
after the Second World War. Farmers’ unions are today of far greater importance in terms of 
political organisation than are local governments.  
 
At the local level, the church was equally a factor of importance for many centuries. It is 
however difficult to isolate the church as a separate influence from other actors such as the 
state and the lords before the middle ages. The church, embodied by the presence of one or 
more priests in the village, interacted with rural households in a number of ways. Next to its 
spiritual functions, organising rituals and administrating sacraments, the church was deeply 
involved in the economic and social life of rural families. 
Firstly, the church was directly involved in agricultural life. Church taxes, and especially 
tithes, were quite common throughout north-western Europe. The church continued to benefit 
from the proceeds of local rural production through tithes until the late eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries. Like many other medieval forms of surplus extraction, the importance of 
tithes gradually declined during the early modern period. In all regions studied in this book, 
tithes had disappeared by the second half of the nineteenth century. Secondly, the church also 
governed daily life in rural communities. Like village councils, they mediated the relations 
between their parishioners and higher administrative echelons. More importantly however, the 
church also intervened in the household decision-making process. Especially with regard to 
the process of household formation, some regions displayed examples of significant influence 
on the timing of marriage and reproduction. The church, for example, justified the pattern of 
late marriage and sometimes discouraged second marriages. Interference in the context of 
household fertility, in particular the discouragement of birth control, had also been established 
long before the onset of the twentieth century. The ability of a household to deploy its 
productive potentials, especially labour, was thus highly influenced by religion. That said, 
during the nineteenth century the impact of the church in the countryside, both economically 
and ethically, declined significantly. Finally, the church also played an important role in the 
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distribution of welfare in the countryside, and retained this role until well into the twentieth 
century. Originally, one third of the proceeds of ecclesiastical tithes were distributed to the 
poor. During the late middle ages and sixteenth century the church however lost the monopoly 
on rural poor relief and had to share the responsibility with lay welfare associations. Most 
village communities financed welfare expenditure through charitable donations. These 
contributions were aimed first and foremost at the deserving poor of the local community. In 
the lists of recipients, the non-active population was dominant: orphan children, widows, the 
elderly and disabled people. In most regions discussed in this volume, poor relief in the 
countryside continued to be financed through charitable donations until the nineteenth 
century.  
At that time, there was a clear shift in the nature of welfare provision. The state intervened 
more actively in these matters and also forced village communities to raise taxes for the poor. 
Such taxes for poor relief had already been introduced in England around 1600. As a result, 
the interference of the poor law supervisors in the household economy of the labouring poor 
became far stronger. As English parishioners were now forced to share the financial burden of 
poor co-parishioners collectively, they were also more inclined to supervise the activities of 
the poor. The chapters in this volume indicate that, with the exception of England, welfare 
payments were irregular and marginal until the nineteenth century. In areas where proto-
industrial activities became dominant, the pressure to reorganise poor relief was often high. 
Industrialisation pushed poor relief from a local concern to a national problem. For the vast 
majority of the rural population, poor relief did not constitute an important factor of the 
household economy. By the twentieth century, this had changed dramatically. Welfare 
revenue, in various forms, is now an integral part of the household economies and strategies 
of the rural population.  
Throughout the previous sections, the role of the state has been scantily touched upon. 
However, between 500 and 2000 the rise of the state is undoubtedly the most important 
change in terms of external influences on the household economy in the North Sea area. At 
present, the state and supra-state institutions are the single most important external factors 
influencing the decision-making process in agricultural households. The restrictions faced by 
present-day farmers in organising their production are set by either national governments or 
the European Union. The enormous impact of the state on agricultural producers is the result 
of a long historical process. Especially since the sixteenth century, state structures have 
increasingly organised surplus extraction and raised the tax burden. Rural households have 
been greatly affected by these developments. In Flanders, for example, increasing state 
taxation during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries has been linked to the growth of rural 
industries. The state organisation also affected rural household economies through different 
forms of legislation. Law enforcement, in the domains of labour markets, land markets, credit 
markets, common land and so on, has shaped the household economies of the rural producers 
increasingly since the fourteenth century.     
 
13.5 Concluding section 
 
During the second millennium the gradual integration of large rural areas in regional and, 
later, globalizing market economies subjugated and transformed peasantries. It put increasing 
pressure on the access to their essential means of production: land, labour and capital. One of 
the main conclusions of this book is that within this slow but structural transformation, rural 
families over time and place followed different trajectories and developed diverging 
repertoires of adaptation and resistance. The rich and varied pictures drawn in the regional 
chapters in this volume show that there is not one master-narrative of gradual deruralisation 
This implies that trajectories of rural transformation only can be understood within their 
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regional and social context, at least until the late nineteenth century. The chapters reveal in 
fact two important periods of change for the rural populations around the North Sea. 
The transition from the medieval to early modern period was a first and major historical 
watershed. At the end of the middle ages most of the rural population in this area had 
managed to free themselves from the manorial economy and especially from the labour 
services imposed upon them by the lords. Labour organisation became increasingly complex 
and choices could be made more freely in terms of household labour allocation. These 
processes generated a strong regional and social differentiation. Regions with capitalist 
agriculture, dominated by commercial farms and wage labour, developed in the area around 
the North Sea. These regions were bound by two other types of peasant societies. The first 
combined small-scale family farming with an expanding proto-industry, thus creating a 
commercial subsistence economy. More distant, but still integrated in the regional division of 
labour, there was a more autarchic rural society with a significant labour surplus. The 
commodification of labour and surpluses instigated internal social differences. Production on 
agricultural holdings became increasingly diversified throughout the early modern period. 
Vast numbers of the rural population engaged in activities other than traditional agriculture. A 
growing part of rural income came from commodified labour, either through proto-industrial 
work or as hired labour outside the farm and the village. Village communities and institutions 
also replicated these patterns, with their inbuilt economic, social and political inequalities. 
Along with a gradual decline of the commons, property rights became more individualistic.  
A second major turn can be discerned in the last quarter of the nineteenth century. As 
agricultural trade globalized, large-scale grain and food imports provoked a fall in market 
prices. The number of farmers started to decline in almost every region, though the  timing 
and speed of decline differed. Surviving family farms had to reorganise themselves in order to 
produce commercial crops and livestock. In these farming households, family labour was 
more and more restricted to the nuclear household, gradually excluding all forms of labour 
exchange with other family and non-family relations. Non-agricultural alternatives, such as 
sub-contracting production,  new industrial activities and opportunities for urban workers to 
commute from the countryside relieved the growing tension between labour and income. 
Expelled surplus labour could largely be absorbed by urban and rural industrialisation and by 
the new service sectors. Rural society separated into a smaller fraction of market-oriented, 
specialised family farmers and a growing portion of households with an income outside 
agriculture and outside the local economy. Villages in these regions suburbanised and became 
part of larger systems of employment, transport and trade. Regional differences were 
gradually fading away in favour of a much more uniform ‘subrural-suburban’ society.  
 
